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An Anal ys i::; 01·

1650-1865

the ·ch'ing Land Tax B1H·deu,

•

Introduc tion

in an agrarian ecouomy,

the purpol::le of land taxi:,; to enal>le

the governme nt to acquire the means (i.e.

food and ~lothing )

sustain the labor i·orce which it hi1·es or recruits .
T'ang period (618-906 ),
base,

to

ln the early

while t.he adult male (tinq) was the tax

laborers were acqui1·ed L,y co1·vee (yung) and tax in kind was

carried out separate ly for· food
(under the name of tiao).

1

(under the name of tsu) and cloth

Uut ttd::; tux .system together with the
functio11 l>y the ~nd of

land allotmen t system finally ceased lo
the eighth century.

2

Thereaft er,

the evolution of the land tax

system during one thousand year::; or·

.80

was mainly a result_ of the

developm ent of the market system a11d populatio n pressure .

Peace

time corvee was gradually replaced by "contrac tural" hiring in tho
market.

Payment in kind was pa1·tly commuted i11to moneta1·y paymeut.

Land instead of lal>or g1·adually

took ou 1·elative and absolute

scaracity value and beca111e the lax ba.se.
lJuring the Ch'inu pe,·iod (16 11 11-1911),
tax sy:stem iuherite< l f1·0111 l'-liuu ti111e:::; weut
of evolution .

lu tenu.s of pay111e11t,

the tradition al

through it.s final

land
stage

.th,~ p1·actice of commutat ion

2

(che-yin} was iustitulion alized.

In terms of the tax base, the

shifting of the incidence of t h e · ~ tax into a land tax (t 'an
ting-ju-ti) definitely made land the sole tax base.
The Ch'ing land tax system was able to function smoothly by
the end of the eighteenth century whc11 the dynasty was at its
prime of prosperity .

However, during the second half of the

nineteenth century, the land tax system had lost its efficiency
so that it was not able .to help provide more revenue for programs
of industriali zation which the uovenunent undertook in response
to the impact of the West.

The inflexibil ity of the land tax

system may be accounted for one of the major institution al
disadvantag es which hindered the transition of traditiona l
Chinese economy.
To investigate the weaknes::; of this tax system, we should
pay attention to the concept of tax burden.

3

The weakness of

the Ch~ing land tax system is manifested in the gradual reduction
of the tax burden.

From the viewpoint of the government , the

reduction of the tax burden meant that tax revenue decreased.
The purpose of this paper is to trace this weakness to two
practices:

that of commutatio n and shifting of the inciden~e of

labor services into land tax.
ln the following paper, we shall first sketch briefly the
basic features of the Ch'ing land tax system (Section 1).

Then

we shall provide a model to analyze the commutation practice and

J

I.he

fixed

the way
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and apply

lliul

theory
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011
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,,,:;

k11ow11 i11 Mi11u a11d t'au011

the other· hand,
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J> ,- a c t i c e
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( c h t, - y i

t o s i I v er
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hud e vo l ved •

de.sign of

tile Ch

I

L.1.11<1 tax ;:;y:,;tem,

i.n\J

l el

.Since

,;ece adopted i11

lhc two major cha1·acte1·i .slics whil,

these were
the

i

11 11

u.s i11.vestigate

their ecouomic siu11i ficance ::;cpar·alely .
Commutatio n

The Practice ot
The

land tax sy::;le111 11 ... d

Ch' ing

the

Al tl1ou!Jli a

inherited from tile Mi11u system.

feature

rul lowiuu

Lttx <1uola for

piece of land wa.s stipulated .ill lc1·111::; of rice

a

(or other kind::; of

urain depending on the crop 1·euio11::;), -the fulfillmen t 01· that tax
obligation involved payment

in 1·ice or pay111e11l

ol.Jv i

uu::, 1·ea.so11.

The

The practice of

co111111ulatio1 1.

latter was called the r~ractice ol
con11uulatio1 1 must ar-i ::,e for an

in silver.

In

a

larye

agrarian empire charactt,riz ed by liete1·uue11 cily of crop regions

,,

(e.g.

rice,

u,illet

wheat,

etc.

J

such as China,

lhe ::;tandard of value

uovernment must ::;elect 011e co111111oui Ly as
for

taxation purposes.

rice was the natural

Uecause u l

cttudidate.

I

ls

the central

i.ntri11::si c

the 011c hand,

011

properties ,
the governmeut

wanted to stock rice for suppor·Li11u ::;oldier:s and fur
relief.

vn

the other ha11d,

the best proxy

.

l or 111011ey.

.

5

or ull

Thu::,

the corumoditie: :;,

101·

.t

.

.

commutatio n is an 1nd1::;pe11::1,, 1,J., device.
However,

famine
r·ice was

11011-rice urowiny reyiou,

6

even for· such r· i <.e u1·ow111u reu i 011::; as .Suny-chi a11u

and .Su-chou which will

l)(! 1,tt..,,· i..llli.lly;.'.;ed iu uul' paper,

mutation practice wa::; us<!d

t.u

i11crease

the com-

l11c citicicucy of the t,,x

5

system.

This was due lo the facl that in a larue agrarian empire

such as China, the land tax system itself was a device for
"spatially oriented unilateral

transfet·."

Let us use an example

to illustrate this idea.
In Diagram la, suppose Sung-chia11 u, represented by a poiut
(or "vertex") S,
silver of which

is to pay a total tax payment of 100 ounces of

s 1 °30

ounces will be spent in !'eking (P 1 ) and
This spatial pattern of unilateral

transfer (S =JO, S ~70) in terms of silver is merely an accounting
1
2
device to accommodat e a commodity transfer (e.g. rice) produced
by taxpayers in Sung-chianu and t1·ans.ferred to beneficiar ies in
Peking and Ta-t'ung.

Assuming lhe price of rice is 2 ounces of

silver, then the amount of rice transfer tu l'eking is T 1 =15 and

to Ta-T'uug, T,,=35-

...

This real resources transfer is facilitated

by the merchant.;:; who mahe the actual a·ice shipment to the
beneficiar ies in Peking and Ta-t'unu.

These beneficiar ies make

consumptio n expendi lures of C 1 =JO aud c 2 -·70 which are financed
by the tax revei. ,,e.
The flow chart in Diagram la is split into a financial
component in Diagram lb au<l a 1·e,d compoueut iu Diagram le.

The

real component indicates the ultimate objective of this spatially

orientt,d u11ilateral

trau~;fe1·.

\'!1<·11

...t

politic.:d ly unified country

is larye and is characle1·iz ed l.ly differentia ted reuional land
fer·tility as i11 Chi11a, real re.so111·cl:.S a1·e 1·outi11ely transferred

6

out of the rich rcu i 01,

;,

such as Su-ch ou and Sung- chi ang,

7 to the

poor regio ns.
nal arran geThe finan cial compo nent is merel y an i11st itutio
ment to accom modat e the unila teral trans fer.

Notic e that in

in that at every
Uiagr am 1b, the flows form a close d circu it
verte x

s,

outfl ow.

P

1'

and P

2'

the total inflow of silve r equal s total

carri ed
This shows that the unila teral trans fer is being

nting devic e (i.e.
out with the use of silve r as the prima ry accou
stand ard o:f value ).
silve r is the means of payme nt as well as the
flows
A ratio nal patte rn of inter -regi onal resou rces
very comp licate d
assoc iated with unila teral trans fer can be a
pheno menon .

In l>iagr am 2a, Sung- chian u trans fers

of silve r to Yunna n (P 3 ).

s

3

~50 ounce s

'!'he tax money ii:. being used by the

x and y diife rent
latte r to ac~u ire goods produ ced in loca lities
from Sung -chia ng.

e
These loca lities will in turn spend the incom

from Sung -chia ng.
so gener ated to acqui re comm odity shipm ents
of this patte rn
The finan cial compo nent aud the real compo nent
are shown in Viayr ams 2L aud 2c.

The ratio nal patte rn of real

such facto rs as the
resou rces :flow (see Uiaur am 2c) depen ds upon

\

iities as well as
comp arativ e cost or produ ction i11 vario us loca
the trans porta tion cost betwe en them.
the major form
Since the laud tax in an a~ra1· ia11 econo my is
it::; effic iency must
of taxat ion, a prima ry crite rion to evalu ate
al patte rn of
Le wheth er or not it lead::; to an optim al spati

7

resources utilizatio11.

The only way that t•his optimal pattern

can be realized is by making use of the market system in which the
merchants guided by the price system play a key role.

The purpose

of Diagrams 1a and 2 a is to portray the operation of such a market
system.

The economic significance of the commutation practice is

that it is a crucial part of an organizational design which leads
to efficient patterns of spatical resources allocation aasociated
with inter-regional unilateral resources transfer.

It is conducive

to a full utilization of the market system.
A major question we should now raise is the following.
Suppose the total tax quota of Sung-chiang is 100 bags of rice
or 200 ounces of silver per year.

The total payment in silver

is 150 ounces, i.e. out of the rice quota of 100 units, 7~ units
are to be commuted into silver (150 ounces), hence only 25·units
of rice must actually be paid in rice.· The commutation rate is

75 percent (i.e. 75 percent of the tax quota is paid in silver).
Our empirical data show that in the period from

1656 to 1865, the

commutation rates were fairly stable (i.e. usually around 50
percent to 4.9 percent in the case ·of Su-chou and 64. to 6) percent
in the case of Sung-chiang).

What then accounts for the sta~ility

of the commutation rate:
Our conjecture is that part of the tax quota not commuted
(i.e. paid in rice) was corresponding to t.uose usages of rice which
could be most efficiently handled under government auspices.

8

Typical items included in this category were:
local official warehous~s;

(1)

storage in

(2) tributary grain shipped by govern-

rnent sponsored transport system (ts'ao-yun).

Traditionally,

these shipments were destined to strategically located warehouses
serving· the needs of the capital city and the garrisons in th~
frontier.

The major characteristic of non-commuted payment in

iice was that it required neither a market system nor merchan~s
to achieve its well defined and obvious spatial patterns of
allocation.

Thus what lies behind the stable commutation rate

is the stability of the ratio of "two streams of spatial ·rice
:flows"

one most efficiently served by the market system and

the other most efficiently served by government means.
The Absorption of Labor Service Levy by Land Tax
The principle of land taxation in traditional China went
through a long process of transformation (or evolution) from the
"two-tax" syste111 (liang-shui-fa) of the late T'ang dynasty
(formally announced in 780 A.D.) to the "single-whip" system
(i-t'iao-pien-fa) of the late Ming dynasty (started from the
1520 's J.

In these seven hundred or so years, China gradually

experienced population pressure and intensive land cultivation,
so that land instead of labor gradually took on scarcity value.
The emergence of "economic 1·t,nt" (i.e. the emergence of land as
a major capital asset in an agrarian economy) and the administrative
feasibility of land assessment, natu1·ally led to the selection of

9

land (i.e. area of cultivation) as the primary object of taxation.

8

This major principle of evolution in the tax system manifested
itself in the absorption of labor services levy into t~e land tax.
What emerged finally is a mixed system in which a "tax on labor"
was imposed on a "tax on land".

Let us first povtray this idealized

system analytically.
When the tax on an adult male of b units of rice is added on
to a tax of R units of rice per unit of land, the total amount of
tax per unit of land cultivated by L units of adult males is
given by

1) T =- R

+

bL

This is shown by the straight line AB (i.e. the "idealized" tax
line) in Diagram

J,

where units of adult male (L) are measured on

the horizontal axis.

This line indicates an idealized situation

in which the levy on labor services (bL) is added to the tax on
land (R).

For example, with L=2, the total tax payment of T 2

consists of R units of land tax (ti-shui) and 2b units of tax on
adult male (ting-yin).
According to

Adrun

Srnitl1, two basic principles in the design

of a tax sybtem are its productiveness (i.e. yielding adequate tax
9
revenue) and administrative feasiuility.

As far as productiveness

is concerned, the idealized t>ystem provides for an increasing tax
revenue whenever the land is being more intensively cultivated due

10

to population pressure.

Obviously, without the labor tax (bL)

in equation 1, a fixed land tax per unit of land (R) will clearly
be

inadequate to maintain the tax yield as a fixed proportion of

output and/or economic rent when land is more intensively cultivated.
From the viewpoint of administrative feasibility, the
idealized system encountered a basic difficulty of tax evasion
through under reporting of the number of adult males.
J, after T
T;

Ti,

In Diagram

the realistic tax line is shown by the dotted curve

2

with T1< TJ and T{< T 4~

Moreover, after

Ti, the realistic

tax line becomes horizotal indicating a situation of increasing
ting without increasing tax (tzu-sheng jen-ting yung-pu chia-fu).
For example, after point

Tl,

with i·our or more ·adult malea

cultivating land, the actual payment remains three ting.

Hereafter

the tax payment of R+Jb will be pttid regardless the intensity of
cultivation.
While the practice of this sort must have been prevalent
towards the end of the Ming dynasty, the Ch'ing ruler made all this
official.

The K'ang-hsi emperor (1662-1722) under the guise of a

benevolent ruler, took a decisive action in 1712 to freeze the tax
quota of ting at the level of 1711 and finally eliminated the
possibility of increasing tax revenue from this source altogether.

10

Soon after this decree was issued, a fixed ting tax quota (called
ch'ang-o) was officially adopted at different times for different
localities and allotted to the land tax to form the historical tax

11

base (in our exami,le, R+Jb at the point T

4 in

Diagram

J). 11

This

historical tax base could not be changed except for minor reason•• 12
In summary, the pre-modern Chinese land tax

syste■

went

through a process of transformation during the course of more than
seven hundred years.

What began with a tax on people in the 1!!!,

yung-itao system in early T'ang time& gave way under population
and administrative pressures to a fixed tax quota on land
symbolized as the "single-whip".

This principle of taxation wa•

combined with a commutation practice to enhance its efficiency ot
unilateral transfer in a spatially

integrated agrarian economy.

These briefly sketched features will serve as backgrounO tor our
analysis below.

13

II. A Theoretical Analysi• of the Land Tax Bu~den
The twin features of the Ch' ing land tax system--i. e. the
fixed tax quota on land and the fixed commutation rate--which were
adopted in the early days of the Ch'ing dynasty had given the tax
system an unexpected and undesirable property of inflexibility and
rigidity.
inadequate.

The net result was that the government revenue was
It is clear that wi_th a relatively constant amount

of land and a fixed tax quota, revenue can not keep up with the
expansion of agricultural output as population increases.

However,

the difficulty is compounded because the fixed quota system operated
under the fixed commutation rate, leads automatically to a lightening

12

of the tax burden in terms of rice when the price of rice increases.
It is the purpose of this section to investigate the al ie issue
analytically.

We shall introduce, in succession, the concepts of

tax quota and tax payment pattern, the commutation price, the deQree
of tax burden, and the commutation rate.

The theoretical analysis

of this section will be statistically implemented in the next
section.
Tax Quota and Tax Payment Pattern
Let the tax payment in rice be Rand the tax payment in silver
bes.

Suppose the tax quota in rice is Q and that the mark~t price

of rice in silver is p.

Then the alternative pattern of tax

payment which fulfill the quota is given uy

2) pQ = pii. + S

In Diagram l.t, let R (S) be measured on the horizontal (vertical)
axis.

The quota in rice is represented by the distance OQ on the

horizontal axis.

The term pQ (i.e. quota in silver) is represented

by the distance OM on the vertical axis.

The alternative patterns

of tax payment satisfying equation 2 aie represented by the points
on the straight line QM.

Every point on this tax pattern line is

equivalent in value to the tax quota in rice (OQ) or in silver (OM).
When the quota in rice (uQ) is fixed, any change in the price
of rice (p) will lead to a shift of the tax payment line.

The

straight lines QM' and QN" represent the system of tax payment lines

1)

with the same quota.

A higher line in this system indicates a

higher price of rice (i.e. larger p).

Thus at points A, A , aqd

1

A , with the same tax payment in rice (OB), the tax payment in
2
silver is larger as the price i,,creases (AB< A1 B < A B).
2
Commutation Price
The alternative tax pattern lines (QM, QM', QM") portray an
idealized situation in which th~ rate of converting rice into
silver for tax payment purposes reflects the market price of rice.
Those who were responsible for the disign of tax system were
obviously aware of the fact that _if the commutation price was fixed
(i.e. if the commutation price represented by the line 01 remains
unchanged) and failed to reflect the fluctuating market price, the
taxpayers would gain at the expense of the government treasury
when the market price o.f rice increased (e.g. A1 B < A B).
2
opposite was true when the price of rice fell

-The

(e.g. AB< A B}.
1

It

is for this reason that the central government stipulated an
administrative procedure through which the commutation price
could be changed.

This procedure required the local officials to

1
"memorialize" to the central government for the change of price. 4:
Such an administrative procedure was adopted for the obvious
reason of protecting th0 government treasury on the one hand and
the taxpayers on the other from the arbitrary decision of local
officials.
In fact, the frequent change of the conooutation price was

14

very difficult to administrate for a technical reason.

The price

of rice can fluctuate for various reasons, such as seasonal,
secular, and more violent chanoe due to short-run crop failure.
Without very elaborate statistical techniques, it is virtually
impossible to make frequent adjustment of the commutation price.
Suppose the government announces a commutation price of ~ice
(r) according to which a portion of tax quota in,rice is to be
commuted into silver.

Then the alternative pattern of tax payment

is given by

.J)

rQ = rH

+

S

In Diagram 4, suppose the tax pattern line according to the market
price is QM.

In case the commutation price is lower than the

market price (i.e. r < p), then the tax pattern line corre~ponding
tor is represented by a straight line such as QM' which is lower
than QM.

Conversely, the straight line QM" represents the case

in which the commutation price is higher than the market price
(i.e. r > p).

Analysis of Tax Burden
Let us analyze the impact uu the tax burden when the com
mutation price is less than the market price.
Suppose A is a typical point on the tax pattern line QM'
determined by the commutation price.

We can draw a ~traight

dotted-line AC parallel to QM, the tax pattern line determined by

15

the marke t price .

Let AC inter sect the horiz ontal axis at C.

since AB units of
Since OB repre sents tax payme nt in 1·ice and
01· BC units of rice,
tax paym ent in silve r have an excha1 1ge value

oc,

the 'tota l tax payme nt in rice is

which falls short of the

The dista nce CQ= a repre sents the amoun t of

quota (i.e. OC < OQ).

the reduc tion of the tax burde1 1.
of tax burde n
Notic e that the magn itude of I.lie rt::du ctiou
is deter mine d by two i·acto rs, name ly,

the actua l amoun t of tax

marke t price and the
payme nt in rice OB and the ~iap betwe en the

r

comm utatio n price (p-r) .

Thus i

large r amoun t of rice tJU'

be puid

point is A•.

ln this case,

the uuver rnnen t insis ts that a
(UU' >Olli ,

the tax payme nt

the value uf tax paym~ nt in rice is

becom es small er
OC' and hence the reduc tion of tax burde 11a'
( a'<a) .
tmen t of the
Suppo se the gover nmen t mukes au upwar d adjus
comm utatio n price .

No,., the tax 1wtte n1 line is QA".

Becau se of

reduc tion of the tax
the narro wing of the price gap l~-r) , the
burde n is again small er (

u' < u ).

Vurth ermo re, when the

t price , the tax payme nt
comm utatio n price is hiuhe r thau the marke
line QM" is highe r than tlae liuc ~M.

At che tax payme nt point A,
2

the amoun t of u".
there is now an incre ase of tax L,urdc n to
ln order to 111easu 1-e the dcu1·e e o,

actua l tax burde n, we

as a
can expre ss the amoun t of the tax Lui-de n
quota .

For exam ple,

at point A,

fract ion of the tax

the deu1·e e of the tax burde n is

16

~) u = OC/OQ ·•··••••••·····(dcuree of tax burden)

when u

< 1, the tax bui-den is l

e::;s tlwn the quota.

For example, if

\

u=-.U then the taxpayers only have to pay 80 percent of the quota.
Commutation Hate
When the co~uutation price is less than the market price
(r

< p),

the actual tax Lui-den L1t.!Cuwe:::. 1 iuhter when the taxpayers

have the privileue oi' makinu 111ore lox. payments in silver.
denote the extent

(or deureeJ of thi::. privilege by v,

Let us

i.e. v is

payment i·n silver expressed a:::. ~ J.i' ...u.:tiun of lhe tax quota in
silver computed at
Viaoram

5)

Thus a~ point A in

the cur11111ut..aliu11 price.

4,
V

= Al.3/01'1'

c~uu/u~J ····••··••

This ratio v is tht: co111111utat.i.u11

r<tl.e

(co~uutation rate)

,,hi.ch is i'airly stable

throuuh time .for reasons al1·c,H.ly di ::.cu::.sed.

There is a logical

relation Lctween this rate aud the dcuree of tax burden u:

6} a.

u

b.

U "- (p-cJ/p

In equation

6u, u is the

(p-r} as a

dcu1.·ec ul

price uap,-i.e.

fractiou of llw 111.:tl'l,ct. pr·ice (p).

Equatio1.

that tax burden is lighlc1- ,,1he11 v i s lu1·ucr (i.e.
tion rate i::; hiuli) and/01·

\vllt,11

u

i::;

the price gap

6a states

when the commuta-

1,.u·ue (i.e. when the· degree

17

of price uap is larye) .

Nulice Llwl ,,he11 the co111111 utation price

is less than the market price (1·< pJ,

u i::; a

posiliv e fractio n

15
.
.
. .
b ecause bot tl v and u are pus1t1 ve 1racl1 ons.
study.
These equati ons pi·ov i de the Jramew ork for empiri cal
ln Sectio n 111,

we shall explai1 1 the 11alure of ::;tatis tica-1 data
The applic ation of these data

which wi 11 be used fo1· this study.

.

to our theory will be presen ted iu ~eclio n lV.

111.

l<lenti t"icati on of l'ar-aH1e te1·::;
on the
The empiri cal implc11 wntatio 11 of our theory is based

two
data of Su-cho u and Sunv-c hiauv p1·e i"<c,ctur es for ruore than
hundre d years

( 1656-1 865 i

cuvt:1·i1 1u

1110;;:;L

(>f the

Ch 'ing dynast y.

ected ::.o that the land tax

This two-hu ndred- year pe1·iod i:::;

ti<1l

burden can be investi gatet.1 i11 a

luu!J-t cnu histor ical perspe ctive.

The two prei·ec tures are ::;elect ed

101·

two real:lon s.

On the one.

total
hand, they are quauti tativu ly impucL. i1,L as togeth er their
land tax paymen t accoun ted fo1·
land tax of the countr y.
needed for our ::.tudy

16

u11

111u,·,,

tli.,11

JO percen t

tile oti1l:r lict11d,

(i.e. t,,i. quul.1 1../,

of the total

atatisti t.:..41 data

tax paymen t in rice Rand

in silver S, and the market price pi ,u·e .:.vaila ble.
At any 111oment in time.,

tile qu;:,d1· uplet 11u111b1::r::; (Q,R,S ,p)
\,heu they are

consti tute the primar y data 110eded

lur

our study.

identi ty

tlit.:

i"our indica tors (r,

availa ble, we can iu tur11
in this given order.

g, v, u)

18

s

r

7) a. Commutatio n lH" ice

Q-R

.... -.................

b. Price gap as a fraction of market price
c. Commutatio n rate
d.

When Q, H,

V

Uegree of tax burden

s,

=

AB
OM'

=

-rQs

1...:vg

u

9

==

.e..::£_ By (6b)
p

........
..................
{"'

.£:.!!
Q

By (J)

)

By (5)
By (6a)

pare substituted in these equations, we can readily
In addition to thesa indicators ,

calculate the values of r, g, v, u.

we also need to verify the hypothesis that the tax quota (Q) per
acre of land is relatively constant.

As we have shown in Diagram

J, at'ter the point T l1• _, a historical tax base (or quota) is fixed
once and for all.

To verify this hypothesis , we need the additional

primary data of acreauc of land (A), based on which ·we can compute
the tax quota per unit of 1 aud,

i. c.

8) q:a Q/A

The values of p, r,

u,

v, u'

(J

"idcnlified

1117 in this _way

for the Su-c..ou and Sung-chi,ang prefecture s are summarized in
Table l for the indicated landmark years.

The primary data

sources and the procedure which we have used to calculate these
parameters will be explained i11 the appendix.
(insert Table 1)

IV. Empirical Analyl::lis of Tax Uunien
The tim1:i series for the .six indicators of Table 1 are shown
in the three panels of IJi«uram 5-

J8

The· top panel contains ti.s:

'

19

6a

time series u, v, and y needed to implc,uent equation

u = 1-vg) for the analysis of the degree of tax burden.

(i.e.

The

tax quota per unit of land (q) is shown in the middle panel; the
market price (p) and the commutation price (r) are shown in the
lower panel.
Note that the time serie::; for each indicator for both
prefectures are shown in the same panel oL IJiagram

5.

Thus there

are altogether six pair::; of time series for the six indicators.
It should be stressed that the put ten1s of time trend for the two
prefectures are quite similar for ev~ry pair.

This similarity

not only facilitates our discussiou, but more importantly, it
indicates that the same set ,,f ::;ocio-ecouomic forces was in fact
operating in these key taxpayi11u districts of south China.

19

'fhe

similarity between the two (H"e1·cctu1·es thus lerlds c.redibility to
our theory.
Prior to 1865, the tux hu1·dcn per
remained practically stable.

011

~

(1

~ =

.16 acre)

the average it was about .J

~

(1 ~ =- lOJ litres) which wu.ti about one seventh of the yield of
.
p e r ~ - 20
ri.ce

After 186 5, u\~i11v to the tax reduction movement

carried out during 186 11-65.

21

·

the -ta·x quota per

to about • 2 shi h in the t ,w p1·efcctures.

~

was reduced

This verifies our

hypothesis of fixed quota per uuit land.
Let us now coucentrate

011

the ti111e patterns of the deyree

of the tax burden as showu Ly the u-curves in the top panel of

20

Diagr am 5.

diatel y
The u-sha ped char acter istic of these curve s imme

d off by a turni ng
revea ls that there were two disti nct phase s marke
point aroun d 1820- 1830.

In the first long phase of appro xima tely

had been a pers isten t
one hundr ed and sixty years (1650 -1820 ), there
tax burde n.
and unint errup ted decli ne in the degre e of the

After

the degre e of the
the turni ng poin t, this trend was rever sed as
a time span of
tax burde n began to incre ase consi st_en tly over
some J0-40 years {18J0 -1865 ).
decli ne in
What is most strik ing was the seve rity of the
·the first phase .

In the case ~f Sung -chia ng, for insta nce, the

-1810 ) was from 1.02
decli ne over one hundr ed and fifty years (1656
to

.48, a drop of more than 50 perce nt.

This means that in.ter ms

of the origi nal
of rice, the tax colle cted was less than half
d phase .
This loss was parti ally recov ered durin g the secon

quota .

JO perce nt.
Howe ver, even in 1875, the loss was more than
tax reven ue
The fluct uatio n and espec ially the decli ne of
ipate d by the
in such en~rm ous magn itudes was clear ly not antic
origi nal desig ners of the land tax syste m.

At the begin ning of

ruler inher ited the
the Ch'in g perio d in the 1650 's as the Ch'in g
Ming

zed to its
·ystem , the burde n of the quota system was reali

full amoun t for a while .

This can be seen from the fact that the

(or even sligh tly
u-cur ves begin from point s which are very close
by a horiz ontal
highe r) than its full amoun t (i.e. u = 1 shown
line) .

resul t of
The decli ne of this tax burde n was a cumu lative
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imperceptible decreases which "crept in" annually (e.g • • 0036 in
the case of Sung-chiang).
Of the two major explanatory variables g (the price gap) and
v (the commutation price), it is apparent that it was th~ forme..:·
which was mainly respor ible for the fluctuation of the degree 0£
the tax burden.

This is clearly seen from the equation u = 1-vg

and the inverse u-shaped character of the g-curves which ·also
have turning points in 1810 and 18JO, coinciding with thoae of
the u-curves.

On the contrary, the dotted v-curves indicate that

the commutation rates were very stable--49 percent in the case of
Su-chou and 6J percent in the case of Sung-chiang--and hence they
were not responsible to the fluctuation of the degree of the tax

burden.
It may be observed in passing that the u-curve of Sung~chiang
lies consistently below that of Su-chou, indicating that the t~x

burden of the former was consistently lower.

This difference

between the two prefectures can be explained mainly by the fact
that the commutation rate of Sung-chiang was consistently higher
than that of Su-chou.

Our conjecture is that Sung-chiang had a

higher.commutation rate for two reasons.

First, the direct

government acquisition of_rice in Su-chou was higher, because it
was situated closer to the canal system, which until, 1825 was
the main route for the shipment of government rice to the north. 22
Second, Sung-chiang was more of a cotton growing region than

22

Su-chou, 23 and hence its crop pattern was more conducive to a
higher commutation rate (see Section I).

Thus the difference

between the two prefectures reflects the difference of their
roles in the spatially oriented unilateral resources transferLet us now look at the market price curves and the
commutation price curves in the lower panel illustrating the time
patterns of the two variables p and r which lie behind the price
gap (g}.

It is very apparent that the inverse u-sha~ed time

p~ttern of g is explained mainly by the behavior of the market
price.

This is readily seen from the fact that the p-curves are

also inverse u-shaped with the turning points in 1810 and 18)0.
In contrast, the r-curves are fairly stable before the turning
points and rise slightly after, therefore, the increase of the
commutation price after 1810 and 18JO contributed somewh•t to
the narrowing of the price gap (g) and to the increasing degree
of the tax burden during the second phase.
The above analysis demonstrates that the enormous fluctuation
of the degree of the tax burden in the hundred-and-sixty-year
period was due mainly to a "monetary" event unfor~seen by the
original designers of the Ch'ing land tax system.

After the rice

quota was rigidly fixed, they also adopted an inflexible commutation
rate (v) and commutation price (r) for administrative and other
reasons (see SeL~ion II), leaving the real impact of the tax burden
completely at the mercy of variations of the monetary price level.

2.3

The variation s of the long-run trend of the price level i• a
monetary phenomen on.

Prices increased througho ut the eighteen th

century and up until 1825, because of the export surplu• -.nd the
24
.
. th e quantity
The price level ayain
.
o f s1· 1 ver.
1n
1ncrease
decrease d because of the import surplus and the silver •~port
owing,to the Opium Var episode.

But whatever the monetary causes

of the fluctuati on of the price level might have been, it

i•

clearly an exogenou s event unanticip ated from the viewpoin t of
the design of a rational tax system.
Conclusio n
It should not be conclude d from the above analyaia that the
time trend for tax burden during the two hundred year• waa
determin ed solely by an accident al monetary factor.

Such a

conclusio n is unwarran ted because it fails to take into consideratio n adequacy of the governme nt revenue.

It is obvious

that the adverse effect on revenue of the lowering of tax burden
in the first phase must have been at least consiste nt with
overall governme nt policy and hence acceptab le.
A basic policy after the foundi

J

of the Ch'ing dynaaty

.

was to lower taxation for well-know n politica l reasons.

25.·

The

pacifica tion of the Three Feudutor ies (San-fan) and then Taiwan
in 168J heralded the beginning of a long periud known to historian s
as the age of great prosperi ty (sheng-C h'ing) which ended with the

lll

24-

termination of the rule of Ch'ien-lung emperor in 1795.

Peace

and prosperity provided a favorable background to realize the
political end of lowering the tax burden.

A sequence of imperial

orders was issued to exempt regular tax payment.

26

Thus We see

the lowering of the degree of tax burden (i.e. the u-curv&s in
Diagram 5) is quite consistent with the overall political
objectives.

The tax system not only yielded adequate government

revenue but was in fact functioning smoothly as can be seen from
· ~---1 27
th·1s per1~.
·
. h tax fu l f.1 11 men t rate wh.1c h Rreva1. l e d 1n
t h e h 1g
The up turn of the degree of the tax burden after 18JO (see
Diagram 5) happens to coincide with the beginning of the politically
much more turbulent period of the nineteenth century.

The shortage

of government revenue became more acute as the pressure for higher
revenues was generated.

28

This pressure resulted in .the up turn

of the commutation pric~ (r} in 1830 (see the lower panel of
Diagram 5) which contributed to narrowing the price gap (g).

At

the same time, the commutation rate (v) began to drop (especially
for Sung-chiang, see the top panel of Diagram

5).

Both adjustments

29
c~ntributed to an increase in the degree of the tax burden.

Thus,

again, we see that the increase in the degree of the tax burden
brought about by the price decrease in this period was consistent
with government objectives to raise revenue.

The above analysis shows that in both phases of the change
of the tax burden the monetary factors operated in a direction

25

which was consistent with basic government objectives.

Such a

land tax system was obviously not a rational one, bec4U&e i~ had
to rely on an unpreditable accidental factor to achieve its
function of producing adequate revenue.
Those who advocate a "single tax system" believe that the
government should rely exclusively on land tax for revenue,
because, aside from yielding adequate revenue, it entails minimum
disincentive effect and is least disruptive of the market system.JO
However, the administrative efficiency of a flexible land tax
system (e.g. the assessment of land tax as a percentaae of output
rather than a fixed quota) is quite difficult to achieve,
especially when the country is very large and characterized by
deversified local conditions such as China.

For this reason 1

after the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) the increasing government
revenue was rais~d mainly by the very disruptive transit tax
(likinj and a host of nuisance taxes (k'o-chuan tsa-shui).

By

1908, the land tax accounted for only 35 percent of the total
government revenue, a decline from about 75 percent in 1753.

31

The transition of an agrarian economy into a modern
industrialized society necessarily requires the use of agricultural
surplus to finance industrialization.
evidences that during the Meiji

There are well documented

lapan, this agricultural surplus

was transferred to the industrial sector.via a reformed and
flexible land tax system.

In the last two decades of the

26

ninetee nth century the land tax account ed for over 80 percent of.
the governm ent revenue of Japan.

32

On the contrar y, tbe Ch'ing

governm ent lacked th~ far sighted ness to launch a resolut e drive
for industr ializati on and modern ization compara ble to the Meiji
governm ent of Japan.

A manifes tation of that reluctan ce was the

lack of enthusia sm for land tax reform and thus the taxatio n
system was left in a hiu11ly chaotic state .during the early
Republi c period (1911-1 937).
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Appendix
In this appendix , we want to describe the primary dat1-~
source which we have used to compute the values of the paramete rs
summeriz ed in Table 1.·in the text.

As explaine d in Section III,

this involves the collectio n of primary data of A (taxable
acreage) , Q (tax quota in rice), R (tax payment in rice), S (tax
payment in silver), and p (the market price of rice) for the Su
chou and Sung-chi ang prefectu res.

Each of these prefectu res has

a number of smaller administ rative units, i.e. the counties
(hsien).
For the primary data of the market price (p), we make use
of the data supplied by several contempo rary authors.

JJ·

We·have

assume that a single price prevailed for all the counties _in any
one prefectu re at any moment of time (i.e. we neglect the price
variation between counties ), because price differenc es between
counties cannot exceed local transpor tation cost.

Moreover , the

prices selected for our two· prefectu res at.differ ent time points
show a secular trend quite similar to that which has been traced

34
out for the Ch'ing period by other authors.
For the primary data, A, Q, H,

s,

we make use of the

statistic al data contained in the prefectu re gazettee rs (fu-chih)
and the county gazettee rs (hsien-ch ih) which are available for
most of the counties and for most of the landmark years.

35

The
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compilers of the local gazetteers often indicated explicit-y that
they in turn, obtained their data from the Fu-i ch'uan-shu (Ihe
Complete Book of Taxation and Labor Services) which provided the
statutory information of taxation for the Ch' inJ period.•

Tue

periodic revision of the latter as reflected in the local
gazetteers is the basis for ou~
dimension for our data.

identification of the time

For example, the "times" shown for the

landmark years, 1656-1710, 1725-1726, 1738-1750, 1830, 1865, in
Table 1 indicate the approximate dates of the Fu-i ch'tlan-shu.
These years are selected because of·the availability of all the
data (A, Q, R, S) which we need.

In case only a part of data

is available the year is discarded.

36
.

The taxable acreage (A) represents the total taxable
cultivated acreage which included various grades of land
generally classi:r'ied as t'ien (rice paddy),
(hilly land), and tang (swampy land).

37

.!i

(dry field), shan

For the taxation

purposes, the land of lower grades was converted to a certGLn
amount of the first grade land.

----

The practice was known as chun.

shou (allowa.·le for well cultivated land) or che-shih (converting
to the taxable unit).

38

Therefore, the taxable acreage was

different from the real spatial area.
The tax quota (Q) represents the tax quota in rice, known
in recordes as p'ing-mi ("eqalized 11 quota of rice).

39

The 1:,cal

gazetteers pointed out that p'ing-wi included the absorption of

29

labor services payment (ting-yin)· as well as tributary rice and
its surcharge.

~o

The local ga~tteers also made it clear that

p'ing-mi (i.e. the tax quota) was a tax obligation which could be
fulfilled either by payment in rice (pen-se-mi) or payment in
silver (che-se-yin)-- corresponding to our definiti9n of Rands.
This practice of commutation was typically described in the
local gazetteers in the following way:

"For total taxable

obligation of p'ing-mi (Q) of so many bushels, the actual
collection (i.e. shih-cheng) consists of pen-se-mi (R) in so-many
bushels and che-se-yin (S) in so many taela. 11
The primary data and the parameters derived from these data
according to our theoretical model for the two prefecture• with
their counties are listed in a set of four tables, which will be
available in duplicated form from the authors.

JO

Footnotes
• The anthors feel grateful to the Concilium of Internation al
Studies at Yale University and the Social Science Research Council
for the financial support to.their research on Chinese economic
history during 1974-1976, out of which this article was written.
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1. A Glossary of Chinese terms and names used in this article
is available in duplicated :form from the authors.
2. For details of the ~ - y u n g - ~ system and the ~ - t 'ien
system, see

Q. C. Twitchett, Financial Administra tion under .!.2.2,

the T'ang Dynasty (Cambridge, 1963), Chapters I and II.

J. For a ~ecent discussion on this topic, see Yeh-chien Wang,
Land Taxation in Imperial China, 1750-1211. (Cambridge , "ass., 1973),

4. John L. Buck,~ Utilization .!.!! China (Nanking 1 19)7),
Chapter II ..

Buck classified the crop regions in China into eight.

5. In the theory of money, before the age of matellic
'
standard, a commodity which posesses the 1·01 lowing properties is

most likely to be selected as

11

money": 1) divisibilit y, 2) -

durability , J) homogeneit y, 4) discernibi lity (or familiarity )
and 5) stability in quantity.

The fact that rice more than any

other commodity fulfills all these properties can be seen from
the fact that during the Sino-Japan ese War (1937-1945 ), rice w~s
chosen as the standard of value for many transaction s (including
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mone tary aystem
comp ensat ion for civil serva nts) as the forma l
was disru pted by infla tion.
re
6. Under rare circu mstan ces, the gover nmen t might requi
purpo aea of tax
the speci al produ cts of a regio n to be used for
paym ent.
ng area• ~as
7. That the tax burde n of Su-ch ou and Sung -chia
since Ku Yen-w u
the heav iest in the coun try has been well known
chUan (volum e) 10.
had noted it in his .:!,!h -~-.!2 ., (Dail y notes ),
See Chou

for this.
Some autho rs have tried to clari fy the reaso n

1
•t•ien yU chung -fu
Liang -h•ia o, "Min g-tai Su-Su ng ti-ch U te kuan

wen-t 1 i

11

heavy ta.x
(The gover nmen t land and its relat ions to the

.!!!.!! !, l e n • ~
burde n in the Su-Su ng areas in Hing times) ,!:,!_6J-75 •
(Hist orica l studi es), 1957.: 10 (Octo ber 1957 '.

Wu Chi

9 (Stud iea on
hua, Hing- !!,!_ ~-h.! !i-ch in9-. £h!_ -~.!! !.!!,- ts'un
ei, 1970) 1 the
socio -econ omic probl ems of the-H ing perio d, Taip
first two chap ters in Part I, PP• 17-73 .

Acco rding to the later ,

to lJ.68 ~ of
the tax quota of Su-Su ng areas toget her amou nted
}.
the count rywid e total durin g the Ming perio d (p.45

Since the

the later Ming,
early Ch 1 ing tax quota was adopt ed from that of
the situa tion remai ned the same.

See !!:! _-~ ~-~ (The

18b-J 3b.
gaze tteer of Su-ch ou prefe cture , 1853 ed.), 12:
8. The aband onme nt of .the earli er syste m of

~-~-~

direc tly to the
preva iling in the early T'ang dynas ty was due
it admi nistr ative ly
lack of accur ate popu lation stati stics that made
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diffic ult to tax on the basis of popula tion.

Howeve r, the

contin uing emphas is on the compi lation of land statis tics
in
culmin ated in the l ! : ! , - ~ - ~ - ~ (Fish- Scale Maps and Books)
the early Ming.

9. Adam Smith,

~

I n q u i r i n g ~ ~ Natu re~ Causes o:f

1965),
the Wealth of Nation s (The Modern Librar y editio n, New York,
PP• 769-77 8.
10. The decree is record ed in Ch'ing S h e n g - ~ ~ - ~ (The
verita ble record of K'ang- hsi period , 1662-1 722), 249:14 b-16a.
11. This proces s starte d in 1716 and finishe d in 1745.

See

collec ted
Ch' ing-tin g ll-Ch 'ing ~-!i!! !, ~-.!l , (Prece dents of the
statut es of the Ch'ing dynast y, the Chia-c h'ing editio n, 1801),
123:11 b-16b.
12. In a locali ty, the tax quota can be chanQe d for a few
and due
reason s: 1) some parts of the cultiv ated lanu become wastel
t
to natura l calam ities; 2) newly reclaim ed land which is subjec
hence
to tax; J) a change {n the admin istrati ve unit bounda ry and
ry •
a shift of the tax quota to corresp ond with the new bounda
. 13. Our brief sketch of the histor ical outlin e of land tax
ical
system is a famili ar story recogn ized by traditi onal histor
analys is.
.fold

The essent ial messag e convey ed by histor ians are thre~

in purpos es:1) non-re aliabi lity of the ting data as a

from
measur ement of adult male, especi ally under- estima tion; 2)
a long-r un histor ical perspe ctive, the tax bnse in tradit ional

JJ

J)
China had finall y shifte d from tax on people to tax on land;
the land tax system using land area as its uase was rather
See Ping-t i

inflex ible and hence a basic cause of corrup tion.

Ho, Studi~ s -2!!. ~ Popula tion 2.!_ China, 1J68-.! ,2ll (Cambr idge,
Mass., 1959), Chapte r II; Yeh-ch ien Wang, Land Taxati on in
Imperi al China, Chapte rs 2 and J.

14. See ffu-e ~-,!l (Regul ations of the Board of Revenu e,
1776, reprin t of the 1865 editio n, TaipeL ,

first compil ed in
1968), 19:8b.

15. As a diagram matic proof of this result , we hav~
OH/OQ, r = OH'/OQ hence

p
g -

1
(p-r)/p = (MM 1 /0Q)/(O M/OQ) = J-U,1 /0M = 1 - OM'/OM

= 1 -

a:

1 -

AB/A B
1

BC/BQ.

on the other hand,
v = AB/OM' = BQ/OQ , then
vg = (1-BC/B Q) (BQ/OQ ) = UQ/OQ - BC/OQ = CQ/OQ, theref ore,

u

~ 1 -

vg = 1 -

cQ/oQ

=

oc/oQ

16. See footno te 6.

17. In the langua ge of econom etrics, what we have shown in
which
this sectio n is the "ident ificati on" of the six parame ters

are essent ial ior our analys is.

The meanin g of

11

identi ficatio n 11

on the
is to make inferen ce on the values of the parame ters based
under
observ able magnit udes (i.e. in our model, A, Q, R, S, and p)
ed
the assump tion tl1at the observ able magnit udes are indeed produc

struc ture.
in a system which can be 'de.sc ribed by the model
ated by the rows
18. The years for which we have data are indic
of Table 1.

on the
Value s ror other years iL lJiagr am 5 are based

techn ique of inter polat ion.
19. The siwil arily oi'

time patte rns exhib ited for the two

by those of the
prefe cture s can in most cases be suppo rted
coun ties of the twQ
small er admi nistr ative units , name ly, the
prefe cture s.
cture s was
20. The yield of rice p e r ~ in these prefe
I
ty._
appro xima tely 2 shih durin g the Ch iug dynas

In the late

an able male could
seven teent h centu ry, accor ding to Cl1'i Fu,
culti vate 12-1) ~ oi' rice paddy ;
amoun t of good land was about
20 ~ ,

JO

see Ho Ch'an g-lin g comp.

the annua l outpu t from- that

shih and from poor land about

lluan u-ch'a o chinu -!!!!!! l wen-

Ch'in g dynas ty, 1827) ,
pien (Essa ys on the state craft duriu u the
26:20 a.

Kuo-f •n,
In the ninet eenth centu ry, accor ding to Tseng

see lluan g-ch'a o cheng 
the yield p e r ~ was from 1.5 to 2 ~ ,
~ ~-ts uan

repri nt,

ty,
( Cl a.ssi f'l ed docum ent ti or the Ch' ing dynas

1969) , 8:4a.

And accor ding to Lin Tse-h tiU, in the

durin g the norma l yeari:; the yield pc1rice which equal ed 2.5

~

~

aOULu ,

was 5 shih of unhus ked

of hui:;ke d rice,

see~,

1:'-)b. ·

rice was produ ced
lJurin g the Ch'in g perio d, ouly one crop of'
~-~ ( 1883 ed.),
annu ally in Kiang :m provi uce, see ~-~

12:J) b.

35

p'ing
.
21. For the.de tails of this .movem ent, .,;.•e Hsia Nai, "T'aiwen-ti 11
t'ien-k uo ch'ien- hou Ch'ang -chiang ko-she ng chih t'ien-f u

after
(The land tax problem of the Yangtz e provin ces before and
the Taipin g Rebell ion), Ch'in g-~ hsueh -~ (The Tsing Hua
Journa l), 10.2 (April 1935), 409-47 4.
22. ln 1825, T'ao Chu, govern er of Kiangs u, propos ed to the
centra l govern ment that the shipme nt of govern ment grain should

.

take the sea route.

See Ch'ing HsUan- tsunw ~-~ {The

84: 26averita ble record during the Tao-ku ang period , 1821-1 850.),
27b; also see Sung-c hiang .!!!_ ~-~ (1884 ed.), 1J:5b- 6a.

For

(The
the detail s, See Ho Ch'ang -ling, Chian g-~ .!!!i-yu n ch'uan- !!2_
c. 18JO).
comple te decume nts of the sea transp ortatio n from Kiangs u,
23. Ch'uan Han-sh eng,

11

Ya-p'i en chan-c heno ch'ien Chiang -au

the
te mien-f ang-ch ih-yeh " (The cotton indust_ ry in Kiangs u before
1
ung,
Opium War), in the author 's Chung -~ c h i n g - ~ - ~ .!!!!!-ts

626(studi es on Chines e econom ic histor y Hong Kong, 1972), pp.
627.
24. Ch'uan Han-sh eng,

11

Mei-ch ou pai-yi n yU shih-p a shih-c hi

th.,
Chung- kuo wu-chi a ke-min g te kuan-h .si" (Au1eri can silver and
author 's
price revolu tion in the eiyhte enlh centur y China) , in the
Chung -~ c h i n u - ~ - ~ ~-ts'u ng,pp . 475-50 8.

Cf. Yeh-ch i en

Wang, "The Secula r Trend of Prices during the Ch'ing Period

s JU:
(1644- 1911)," -11:ll:_ Journa l .21 ~ instit ute~ Chines e Studie
the Chines e Unive rsity~ - Hong Kong, 5.2 (1972) , 354 ■

J6

25. Ch 1 ing

~-~

::;hih-~ (The veritab le record of the ~.,un

chih period, 1644-16 61), 6;9b-10 b.
26. ln 1725, an amount of J00,000 taels for Su-chou and 150,000
taels for Sung-ch iang was reduced perman ently.

Again, in 1737, a

total amount of 200,000 taels for the two prefect ures togethe r was
reduced .

See Su-chou fu-chih (18Bi-e ct.), 12:J4a- 35b; J8b-J9a .

27. Ch'en Ch'i-yu an, Yung- hsien- ~
hsien-c hai, reprint , Taipei~ 1960), 6:8a.

.el-~

(Notes of Yung-

Also bde Su-chou fu-chih

( 188J ed.), .12; 51b-52a .

Pao Shih-ch ' en, An-~ ~-chun g ( Four

works of Pao Shih-ch 'en,

t846J, ~5A:JOa .

28 • .ln 1780, the stock _of silver in the treasur y of the Board
of Revenue reached 70 million taels which was the largest amount
ever accumu lated during the Ch'ing veriod, see llo Chang-l ing,
Huang-c h'ao ching -~ ~-11ie u, ~7:29a.

Uut thi~ stock of silver

gradual ly drained out, as in the 18JO's, the governm ent .began to
find i t difficu lt to keep fiscal balance , see Chu Hsieh, Chung~

ts'ai-ch eng

~-.!.!.

(The fiscal problem s in China, Shangha i,

19J4), pp. 70-72.
29. After the Taiping Heuelli ont the tax reducti on movemen t
resulte d in the decreas e of tax quota for the Yanyt:te provinc es.
However , these reducti ons were in a uature of tempora ry relief and
could not be 1·egarde d as t,vi dence::; contrad i tory to a trend for
higher taxes as seen 1·rom the up swiuu of the u-curve s which
started JO years earlier .

37

JO. For exam ple, See Henry Georg e, Prog ress ~ Pove# ty
, pp. 41J-4 14.
(New York: Robe rt_Sc halke nbach Foun datio n, 1966)
ns-~ ll
Jl. For the histo ry of likin , see Lo Yu-tu ng~ Chu

.£!!!.!!-.!.!!D!,

.
(The histo ry of likin in China , Shan ghai, 1936)

Also

vesti gatio n on
see, Ho Lieb, Li-ch in chih- tu hsin- t'an (A Rein

-~----

arge on land "tax
Likin , Taip ei, 1972) . · For a discu ssion of surch
Yeh-c hien Wang,
durin g the last decad es of Ch'in g perio d, see,
chang es Qf tax
~Tax ation .!-.!! . Impe rial China , pp. 61-66 ; for
struc ture, see Wang, p. 80.
cultu ral
J2. See Harry T. Oshim a, "Meij i 1''isca l Polic y and Agri
:Prog ress,

11

in Willia m

w. Lockw ood ed., !!!.!, State _!.!ll!, Econo mic

), PP• l57-J 81.
Ente rpris e in Japan , (Prin ceton , New Jerse y, 1965
11
Role of Agric ultur e
Also see Kazus hi Ohkaw a and Henry Hosov sky, The

in Mode rn Japan ese Econo mic lJevel opme nt,

11

Econo mic Devel opme nt and

61-62 .
Cultu ral Chang e, IX, 1, part II (Octo ber 1960 ),
~-ts •ung ,
33. Ch'ua n Han-s heng, Chu, <u-~ chin g-ch i-~

ch'ie n-liu -pai- nien
PP• 477-4 78, 510; Liu 1-che ng, "Chia ng-su ko-ti
g a perio d of
chien chih mi-ch ia" (Pric e of rice in Kiang su durin
~-~ (Jour nal
one thous and and six hundr ed years ), ~-hs Ueh

"T'ai -p'in g t'ien of Histo ry), 2.3 (Sept embe r 1930) , 5-Bi Hsia Nai,
kuo ch'ie n-hou , 11 p. 1169.
P• J62.
34. Yeh-c hien Wang, "The Secu lar Trend ," Chart 5 in
ty, the
35. In 1645, the secon d year of the Ch'in g dynas
the Wan- li perio d
gover nmen t first annou nced that the tax quotu of

J8

(157)-1620) in the late Ming should be adopted.

Altliough we

have some data for this year, these data are excluded from Table
1 because they are incomplete in their coverage.
J6. Thus an interval (e.g. 1656-1710) is shown whenever the

--

-

data revision of the Fu-i ch'uan-shu occurred for different
counties and different years, or when the data needed are available
in different years.
~

It should also be noted that the Fu-,!_ ch 'Uan

was also revised in 1775 and 1795 ■

However, the statistics

of the tax quota (Q) for Su-chou prefecture are not available,
therefore, these data are not used.
is also available for·su-chou.

Moreover, the data of 1818

Since th~ calculation of indicators

of tax burden reveals that they are the ~ame as those of t8JO,
thus these data are not used.

37. ln fact, for each type of land there are
for the purpose of taxation.

sub-classifications

For the number of grades of land in

the 18 counties of the two prefectures, sc, S u - ~ ~ - ~
( 1824 ed.), chUan 11; Sung-chi ang f u - ~ ( 1817 ed.), chUan 22.
J8. For example, see Sung-chiang ~-~ (1663 ed.),
2a; Sung-chiang ~-chih (1817 ed.), 21:40a-l1Jb.

7:

1b-

According to Wang

Chen, land which is already cultivated is c a l l e d ~ (,!_-keng

1 Ueh-~), see Nung-~ (Book on agriculture, Taipei reprint of
~-~-ch 'Uan-~ ~-pen), 2:Lrn.
~

For the taxation purposes,

was usually used as an opposite of huang, which meant the

cultivated laud that had become wasteland.

But the huang was not

.

.

••• • U • - • • - • • - • • - • • • •

J9

exem pted from taxa tion.

Inste ad, it was redu ced to a certa in

d land .
amou nt and taxe s to be born e by the culti vate

For an

hih (1811 ed.) , 1~:J a.
expl anati on of this , see Chia ng-ni ng .!!!_-c
es (e.g. shou p'ing 
For exam ples of tax quot a of these cate gori

(1824 ed), 8:17 a;
mi and huan g-p'in g-.!!! !.), see ,2!! -~ ~-~
40b.
!!!!,. first appe ared
J9. The histo rica l orig in of the term p'ingChou Ch'en initi ated
in reco rds durin g the 14JO 's when gove rnor
a progr am of tax equa lizat ion~

His meth od was to allo t equa lly

g the proc ess of
the amou nt of rice charg ed for wasta ge durin

orig inal unit o! tax
trans port ation , know n as ~-.!! !i,, to e_ach
quot a in rice , know n as chen g-~.

.!!!!.

The tota l of~- !!!!, . and chen g

the basic tax quot a.
was given the name of p'ing- !!!!_ and becam e

Ch'in g dyna sty.
This prac tice was carr ied on throu gh the
Chou Lian g-hs iao,

11

See

Ming -tai Su-Su ng ti-ch 'U," p. 70.

in some loca l
40. The deta ils of allot ment can be seen

-~ ( 1824 ed.) , chUan 11.
gaze tteer s, for exam ple, see ,2!! -~ .!!!,

Table 1.

Parameters fo~ Tax Burden Analrsis

v: the commutation rate
u: the degree o~tax burden
q: the tax quota per unit of 1 and

p: the market price
r: the commutation price
g: the price gap

Su-chou
year

p

r

Surig-chiang
g

165b1710

.8

.885

-.106

17251726

1.27

.889

.JOO

u

q

year

p

•r

.497 1.053

.288

1b561662

.8

.820

-.025

.64:4:

1.016 .289

.488

.J04

1775

1.70

.581

.658

.6JJ

.585 .298

V

.854

g

V

'.1

q

,

17381750

1.45

.741

.498

.492

.760

.JOJ

1795

2.75

.610

.778

.632

.509 .298

1830

3.7

.707

.808

• 495

.600

• 265

1810

3.5

.627

.820

.628

• 485 • 290

1865

2.5

1.124

.550

.492

.730

• 163

1875

2.5.

1.130

.548

.563

.692 .179

Source: See AI?.E.endix
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